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soME liAr-liKE PArADoXEs
Resume: This paper formulates some liar-like paradoxes. The basic idea is that self-referentiality, 
classical logic and T-equivalences are sources of related paradoxes. This background is motivated 
by Leśniewski’s-Tarski’s analysis of the classical Liar-antinomy. In particular, paradoxes for 
pedicates “is meaningless” and “is not rational” are stated.
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Ян Воленский
неКоТорЫе ПарадоКСЫ, ПодоБнЫе «лжеЦу»
Резюме: в этой статье представлены некоторые подобные «Лжецу» парадоксы. основная 
идея состоит в том, что их источником являются самореферентность, классический характер 
логики и эквивалентности, связанные с предикатом истинности т. в основе такого понима-
ния лежит анализ классической антиномии «Лжец» у Лесневского и тарского. в частности, 
представлены парадоксы, возникающие в связи с предикатами «быть лишённым значения» 
и «не быть рациональным».
Ключевые слова: логика, референциальность, т-эквивалентности, значимость, рацио- 
нальность.
The classical Liar Paradox (LP, for brevity) runs as follows (it is a slightly modified 
version proposed in Poland by Jan Łukasiewicz and employed by Alfred Tarski):
(1)  the sentence denoted by (1) is false;
(2)  (1) ⇔ (1) is true;
(3)  The sentence (1) is false ⇔ The sentence (1) is true; 
Contradiction!
Remark: How to understand the premise (2)? Some commentators say that it is a non-
sense, because it assume the equality (1) = (1) is true, but this equation is plainly false, 
if identity is understand in its official logical meaning. Imagine, however, that we cor-
relate some objects with numbers (numerals), for example, say that Lionel Messi has the 
number 10 as a soccer player in FC Barcelona or the Argentinian national team. Conse-
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quently, we are entitled to say 10 = Lionel Messi in such and such context. The same can 
be said in the case of LP. What is important, is that the equivalence (b) is justifies by this 
convention. 
Stanisław Leśniewski, followed by Tarski, offered a diagnosis of Leśniewski–Tarski. 
According to them, we can identify three sources of LP
(i) Self-referentiality of the predicate “is false”;
(ii) T-scheme, that is, the formula A is true ⇔ A;
(iii) Classical logic.
This diagnosis opens related possibilities concerning of how avoid LP. The first con-
sists in rejecting self-reference of semantic predicates, the second — banishes T-equiva-
lences, and the third goes by changing logic. According to Tarski, T-scheme is too intui-
tive to be rejected and classical logic should be protected as the best. Consequently, 
rejecting self-reference of semantic predicates leads to the least theoretical costs. A natu-
ral outcome of the first strategy consists in the language (L) / metalanguage (ML) distinc-
tion. An important lesson stems from the above analysis: nothing is free of charge, also 
in logic.
Remark. One can ask whether elimination of self-reference concerns only the predicate 
“is false”. What about the predicate “is true”? Call both as aletheiological words. It was 
proved that the formula 
(*)  (1) ⇔ (1) 
is true, does not lead to any paradox. However, if we change logic into so-called dual 
logic (or other in which the logical value of falsehood is distinguished; A is a dual tautol-
ogy if and only if it is false for any valuation) (*) leads to the dual LP or the Truth-teller 
paradox (see [Woleński 1995] for details). Thus, both aleteiological predicates produce 
semantic troubles.
Remark. Changing logic does not block the strengthened LP. It is captured by
(a) (1) the sentences (1) is not true (false or other);
(b) (1) ⇔ (1) is true;
(c) (1) is true ⇔ (1) is not true; 
Contradiction! 
If (1) is n (other than false or true), we get (1) is n ⇔ n is true, which also cannot be 
accepted.
A very important observation is this. T-scheme plays the fundamental role in deriving 
LP (if all of its forms). On on the other hand there not paradoxical cases, Consider an 
anthropomorphic sentences that say “I am provable” or “I consists of 3 words”. Clearly, 
we cannot formulate relevant T-schemes. The relation of truth and provability is captured 
by Löb’s theorem, that is, the formula “if A is provable, A is true”. The reverse implication 
does not hold, due to the Tarski undefinability theorem. Turner [Turner 1990; Turner 
1990a] observed that the only-part of T-equivalence, that is, formula “A ⇒ A is true”, 
is re sponsible for LP. Contrary to important uses of the relation between truth and prov-
ability in metamathematics, any attempt to form a T-sentence for “I consists of 3 words” 
(on the than falling under the scheme “A is true if and only if A”) leads to an obvious 
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absurdity, because omitting “consists of 3 words” converts the entire sentence into a nom-
inal expression if we decide to treat A as an abbreviation for “A” or reduces this sen-
tences to itself. 
Are “is true” and “is false” the only predicates, which produce paradoxes similar to LP? 
The answer is negative and I will show that some other predicates share the fate of His-
torically speaking, self-referential use of the “is meaningful” was suspected to be trouble-
some. This problem arose as connected with the question “Is verifiability principles as 
proposed by logical empiricism, meaningful or nor?” (see [Ingarden 1936; Ewing 1937; 
Woleński 1990; Woleński 2010]). Logical empiricists argued that we should accept 
(PV) A sentence A is meaningful if and only if A verifiable or tautological.
Ingarden and Ewing asked whether (PV) itself is verifiable or tautological; I neglect 
difference between both philosophers in their criticism in question. According to Ingarden 
and Ewing, both alternatives are untenable, because if it is difficult to imagine how (PV) 
could be verified by empirical data, but, on the other hand, if this principle is a tautology 
it is devoid of meaning. Consequently, (PV) should be considered as devoid of meaning 
by own criteria or, as Ingarden pointed out, the principle in question smuggles a hidden 
meaning to metalogic and thereby remains unclear.
Carnap briefly commented Ingarden’s criticism at the Prague Congress in 1934 and, 
coherently with his treatment of logic as syntax, argued that metalogical sentences belong 
to pure syntax and, thereby, they do not require empirical verification [Carnap 1936]. 
Consequently, metalogical sentences are tautological just by definition and it means that 
their validity can be established by formal combinatorial procedures. Moreover, Carnap 
stressed that one of the most crucial difference between logical empiricism and phenom-
enology consists in admitting Wesenschau by the latter school and rejecting this kind of 
cognition by the former philosophical group. Although Ingarden could explain the hidden 
meaning of metalogical sentences by recurring to phenomenological intuition, but noth-
ing essentially depends in Ingarden criticism on a specific basis of the hidden meaning. 
It is sufficient to observe that metalogical sentences are meaningful by virtue of other 
criteria than stated by (PV). Both parties can also agree that empirical verification has 
nothing special to do in metalogic. In fact, Carnap and other logical empiricists accepted 
this position and looked for a solution via the concept of analyticity. Pap in his comments 
on Ewing 1937 [Pap 1957] proposed a way out consisting in considering (PV) as a result 
of an analysis of the concept of meaning. Pap remarked that this view overcomes the 
objection that (PV) says nothing at all as being a logical tautology. Actually, this pro-
posal weakens Carnap’s original idea that metalogical assertions 
In order to formulate, the Liar-like paradox for “is meaningful”, we need two follow-
ing additional principle:
(4)  A is meaningful ⇔ ¬A is meaningful; 
(5)  A is meaningful if and only if A is true or false.
The principle (4) says that meaningfulness is invariant under negation. Its justification 
can appeal to the idea that purely logical operations do not influence the logical status 
of their arguments. Consequently, if A is logical sentence (a tautology or contradiction), 
its denial is tautology or contradiction s well, and, if A is factual (neither a tautology 
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or contradiction), its negation is factual as well. Yet negation changes logical value, 
(5) exhibits the form of meaningfulness related to classical logic.
Having the statements (4) and (5), we proceed in the following way. Firstly, we for 
a sentence with the self-referential employment of the predicate “is not meaningful”. This 
step is given by 
(6)  (6) is not meaningful (assumption). 
(7)  ¬(6) is not meaningful (by (4)).
On the other hand, (7) says that (6) is meaningful. Consequently, (6) is either true 
or false (by (5). Assume that (6) is true. It gives 
(8)  (6) is true ⇔ (6) (an instance of T-scheme). 
By the detachment, we obtain (6), but it produces a contradiction, because (6) appears 
as true and not meaningful.
Assume that (6) is false. Hence, (6) is meaningful, but ¬(6) jest meaningful and true. 
If so, we have 
(9)  ¬(6) ⇔ (6) is meaningful.
As a consequence we obtain 
(10)  (6) ⇔ (6) is not meaningful.
However, this step convert us to the former case, because it implies that (6) is mean-
ingful if and only if it is true. 
Remarks. If we say that being not meaningful covers a third value, we obtain the 
strengthened meaningfulness paradox. Ewing [Ewing 1937] observed another difficulty. 
Consider (PV) and ask what happens if we check its truth or falsity without taking into 
account sentences like (6) that is asserting own meaninglessness. Clearly, (PV) should be 
meaningful under its truth as well as under its falsity. However, the latter assumption leads 
to a strange consequence that (PV) is false and meaningful, but in such a case it defeat 
itself. It is not a logical paradox because not all eventualities lead to formal inconsis-
tency (more specifically, it is the case of working under the assumption that (PV) is true), 
but a plain pragmatic or epistemological oddity. Another strange consequence follows 
from inspecting (7). The negation of (6) means that (6) is meaningful. If so, asserting (7) 
commits us to the view that (6) is meaningful, provided that it is not.
Another example of a Liar-like paradox concerns the concept rationality. As an ex-
ample I consider what can called Cartesian rationality defined by 
(11) (a) A is rational iff its truth is dictated the infallible method;
    (b) A cannot be rational and false.
We can form the self-referential sentence 
(12)  (12) is not rational (its truth is not dictated by the infallible method), 
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which leads to 
(13)  (12) is true ⇔ (12) is not rational. 
By propositional calculus, (12) either true by the infallible method and not rational 
or false and rational. However, both possibilities are contradictory. Presumably, one could 
thing that other definitions of rationality suffer from the paradox. Unfortunately, it is not 
so. Let us adopt 
(14)  A is rational ⇔ C,
where the letter C refers to a condition of rationality. Thus, we have
(15)  C is rational ⇔ C;
(16)  C is rational ⇔ C is true.
Now, if we consider 
(17)  C does not satisfy the condition C,
we obtain a version of a Liar-like paradox. The situation can be easily generalized for 
such predicated as “it is analytic”, “it is confirmed”, “it is scientific”, etc. A hypothesis can 
be stated that almost every interesting epistemological predicate falling under the scheme
(18)  A is X ⇔ C (⇔ C is true),
leads to a Liar-like paradox. (18) confirms that the role of T-scheme in Liar-like para-
doxes is crucial. Perhaps the predicate “is dubious” appear as particularly interesting, 
because it is related to the issue of skepticism. 
A general situation looks as follows. If a given principle P establishes the meaning 
of a predicate P referring to properties of sentences such that T-scheme is applicable, we 
can expect that the predicate in question can generate a Liar-like paradox. In order to 
prove that P does not produce paradox, one must prove that “is P” and “is true” do not 
coincide. It is the case of “is provable”. Taking a lesson from metamathematics, P is not 
paradoxical, if there is a procedure, which allows to embed this predicate into the object-
language via a procedure analogical to arithmetization. Unfortunately, it is unclear how 
typical epistemological predicates could converted into the object language. 
However, it does not mean that philosophers must resign from P. Generalizing the 
case of using “is true” in order to avoid the Liar-paradox, we can decide that P is formu-
lated in ML and apply to items formulated in L. Yet this simple prescription leads to 
far-reaching metaphilosophical consequences. Take, for example, the problem of how 
science and philosophy are mutually related. The claim that philosophy (in our case, 
epistemology) is one of sciences, requires an assumption that (PV) and similar principles 
are embeddable into L as it is used in science. As we know this assumption is not obvious. 
I will this fundamental problem without further considerations. Still one remark is in 
order. Pap’s view that (PV) offers an analysis of the concept of meaning leads, as I already 
remarked, to the question “What about the status of this principle and similar ones?” 
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A preliminary and very tentative answer is that such analytical products are analytical 
statements, not reducible to tautologies of LM. Otherwise speaking, if C is a criterion of 
analyticity in L, other (in fact, extended) understanding of “is analytic” functions in ML 
(see [Woleński 2004] for some proposals in this respect).  
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